

GN4-3 T&I Enabling Communities

Maarten Kremers SURF


SIG-ISM / WISE joint workshop

Virtual

29th October 2020



GN4-3 T&I TEAM (2019 – 2022)




Partners



www.geant.org







Operate T&I services

In secure, effective, agile and optimised manner following DevOps principles



Develop and enhance the T&I services

Introducing new features and improving performance, functionality and usability



Explore new or disruptive ideas

Their applicability to T&I services, and feed the results to development and operations teams



Engage with the relevant stakeholders

To understand their requirements and use them to drive the evolution of T&I services



T&I Business Development Coordination



Facilitating of the AEGIS group



T&I eScience Global Engagement

Trust & Identity Outreach

The AARC Engagement Group for Infrastructures (AEGIS) brings together global representatives from **AAI operators in research infrastructures and e-infrastructures**, which are **implementing authentication and authorisation services** that support **federated access**, to discuss adoption of **policy** and **technical best practices** that facilitate interoperability across e-infrastructures and e-infrastructures.



Current Members





AEGIS Charter

The **AARC Engagement Group for Infrastructures** (AEGIS) brings together representatives from research and e-infrastructures, operators of AAI services to bridge communication gaps and make the most of common synergies.

AEGIS ultimately enhances the wider and more effective uptake of AAI recommendations by infrastructures in their federated access solutions, so that they can focus on providing other support for research activities.

Objectives and Scope of AEGIS

<https://aarc-community.org/about/aegis/>




The 'eScience Global Engagement' of EnCo in the GEANT project is there to support those developments in the policy and best practice areas that would benefit the community at large, and do that by means of supporting the work in the existing forums such as WISE, FIM4R, IGTF, REFEDS, AARC-community, and the research and e-Infra communities directly









SCI

Security for Collaborating Infrastructures Trust Framework


Introduction

Research and e-Infrastructures recognise that controlling information security is crucial for providing continuous and trustworthy services for the communities. The Security for Collaborating Infrastructures (SCI) working group is a collaborative activity within the Wise Information Security for e-Infrastructures (WISE) trust community. The aim of the SCI trust framework is to enable interoperation of collaborating Infrastructures in managing cross-infrastructure operational security risks. It also builds trust between Infrastructures by adopting policy standards for collaboration especially in cases where identical security policy documents cannot be shared. Governing principles of the SCI framework are incident containment, ascertaining the causes of incidents, identifying affected parties, addressing data protection and risk management and understanding measures required to prevent an incident from reoccurring. The original **SCI version 1** Framework was produced in 2013.

The SCI Working Group has produced a second version of the framework, to reflect changes in technology, culture and to improve its relevance to a broad range of infrastructures.

[Access the SCI version 2 Framework here](#)







Guidelines for Secure Operation of Attribute Authorities and other issuers of access-granting statements



Comparison of 4 Infrastructure Top-Level Policies – DRAFT													
Ian Neilson, STFC-UKRI, 28/10/2020													
EOSC-hub	AARC PDK												
https://wiki.eosc-hub.eu/display/EOSC/ISM+Policies	https://aarc-community.org/policies/policy-development-kit/												
EOSC-hub Security Policy <small>Created by David Kelsey, last modified by Margorzata Krakowian on 2020 Jul 05</small> Document control <table><tr><td>Area</td><td>ISM</td></tr><tr><td>Policy status</td><td>FINALISED</td></tr><tr><td>Policy owner</td><td>David Kelsey</td></tr><tr><td>Approval status</td><td>APPROVED</td></tr><tr><td>Approved version and date</td><td>v 49 03 Jul 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Next policy review</td><td>together with process review</td></tr></table> Policy reviews <small>The following table is updated after every review of this document. > Click here to expand...</small>	Area	ISM	Policy status	FINALISED	Policy owner	David Kelsey	Approval status	APPROVED	Approved version and date	v 49 03 Jul 2020	Next policy review	together with process review	Top Level Infrastructure Policy Template This policy is effective from <insert date>.
Area	ISM												
Policy status	FINALISED												
Policy owner	David Kelsey												
Approval status	APPROVED												
Approved version and date	v 49 03 Jul 2020												
Next policy review	together with process review												
Introduction	INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS												



WISE Community: Security Communication Challenges Coordination WG (SCCC-WG)

Introduction and background

Maintaining trust between different infrastructures and domains depends largely on predictable responses by all parties involved. Many frameworks – e.g. SCI and Sirtfi – and groups such as the coordinated e-Infrastructures, the IGTF, and REFEDS, all promote mechanisms to publish security contact information, and have either explicit or implicit expectations on their remit, responsiveness, and level of confidentiality maintained. However, it is a well recognised fact that data that is not

Dashboard / ... / SCCC-JWG

Communications Challenge planning

Created by David Groep, last modified by Maarten Kremers on Jan 22, 2020

Body	Last challenge	Campaign name	Next challenge	Campaign name	Status
IGTF	October 2019			IGTF-RATCC4-2019	Completed
EGI	March 2019	SSC 19.03 (8)			(Completed)
Trusted Introducer	August 2019	TI Reaction Test	January 2019	TI Reaction Test	Repeats three times a year

Campaign information

Campaigns can target different constituencies and may overlap. The description of the constituency given here should be sufficient for a human to identify the target. It need not be a detailed description or a list of addresses (which would be a privacy concern since this page is public). Challenges can also be used to test if a contact address does not bounce, to testing if the organisation contacted can do system memory forensic analysis and engage effectively.

- ability to receive – mail does not bounce or phone rings
- automated answering – ticket system receipt or answering machine
- human responding – a human (helpdesk operative) answers trivially (e.g. name)
- human familiar with subject-matter responding – responsible person responds
- service analysis capability – a responsible person or team can investigate and resolve common incidents reported to the contact address

See also <https://www.eugridpma.org/agenda/47/contribution/6/material/slides/0.pptx> for some background.

Please **do not post sensitive data** to this Wiki - it is publicly viewable for now.



FIM4R



Thank you

Any questions?

maarten.kremers@surf.nl



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